01 May 2011
Globe Editorial
By Azad Amin
The political entity in Kurdistan Region came as a result of internal and external factors in 1992,
The persistent administrative and economic problems in Kurdistan Region, and the growing gap of inequalities in distribution of generated wealth, are fundamental sources of public apprehension in which the opposition movement, a combination of secular and Islamic forces, tries to exploit for political gain. This exploitation of the general public's apprehension for narrow political party interests adds to the complexity of the sociopolitical situation in the Region and makes it more difficult for profound and structural adjustment to address the systematic problems faced by both the ruling elite and the public at large. The political entity in Kurdistan Region came as a result of internal and external factors in 1992, and inherited economic and political artifacts of the former Baathist regime. The artificial creation of an Iraqi state apparatus, combined with ethnic and religious heterogeneity, produced an extremely refractory inheritance for state-building. The problem of state-building was put in a contemptuous tone by King Faisal in 1933 and depicts the 20th century's repressive regime in Iraq: "In Iraq, there is still no Iraqi people, but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic ideal, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatsoever."
Following the 1958 Revolution, which overthrew the monarchy and instituted a republic, the landed political class was replaced by civil and military bureaucratic class in control of state apparatus. Monopolization of state apparatus by this new class, under a charismatic leader, was the prime reason for the emergence of state-based clientelism and formation of bureaucratic control organized by the civil- military apparatus. So, the primary functions of the state apparatus have been the consolidation of its rule over and against the other segments of society whether ethnic, class or religious. This was in parallel with strict state control and mobilization of economic resources for state-led economic development. The Baath regime had tight control over social, political and economic life, with a driving ideology of Arab nationalism. This translates to the Sunni assertion in a state where they were significantly outnumbered.
Such main characteristics of the Baath regime, which is not unique to Iraq but can be applied to the most of the regimes in the Middle East, explains the lack of democracy in the region. The development of liberal democracy requires two fundamental preconditions: A significant degree of separation between the institutions of rule and of surplus appropriation, and the ability of the state to uphold its authority against other sites of political command. These two preconditions have been absent not only in Iraq but much of the region.
What was inherited in post-Baath Iraq was a highly bureaucratized state apparatus. The political entity in Kurdistan region since 1992, and the political entity of Iraq in post-Saddam era, faced this serious dilemma to deal with the bureaucratic character of the regime that they inherited.
From 1992 to 2003, the Kurdistan Regional Government, due to limited economic resources and its fragile political existence ― its unrecognized de facto existence combined with unfriendly neighbors due to the Kurdish national question for these neighbors ― failed to fight against the bureaucratic nature of the regime it inherited. The ensuing internal conflict between the two main Kurdish political parties further increased party-based clientelism. What we see in Kurdistan Region during this period was the transformation from state-based clientelism to party-based clientelism within the framework of limited economic resources. This constrained both development of democracy and the formation of a liberal market economy in the region.
What differentiated the Kurdish polity form that of the former Baathist regime is the development of democratic space for other ethnic and religious minorities in Kurdistan. Ethnic and religious minorities in Kurdistan enjoyed and exercised their democratic rights fully, without restrictions. Minority and religious rights in Kurdistan can be compared with European standards, not with the other regional regimes.
Following the demise of the Baath regime, structural alterations fundamentally changed the polity and economy of Kurdistan Region. Consolidation of its political status by the new Iraqi constitution and highly efficient stability and security of Kurdistan opened the door for foreign investment and capital to use Kurdistan as a gateway to the rest of Iraq. Regular income from the Iraqi budget (17 percent) to Kurdistan Region provided better opportunities and resources for the KRG to consolidate its power and status.
The expansion of economic resources, such as an allocated share of the Iraqi budget, foreign capital and investment in the region, which led to an economic boom in Kurdistan, became sources of both economic development and apprehension as the distribution of wealth was not equal.
Whether on purpose or not, KRG's economic policies opened the door for capital accumulation geared toward creating a homemade bourgeoisie and entrepreneurs, alongside a growing middle class in the Region. Along with influx of capital and growing economic resources, party-based clientelism strengthened and capital accumulation was mostly based on this clientelism.
KRG not only failed to eliminate party-based clientelism but also to a certain degree failed to deliver basic public services, such as electricity and clean water. Inequalities in the distribution of wealth, lack of sufficient public services, and lack of equal opportunities became sources of public apprehension towards the ruling elite in Kurdistan.
A proper opposition movement with clear political and economic strategy could have easily mobilized such general public discontent towards radical reforms and improvement of democracy in Kurdistan. What the existing opposition in Kurdistan did was not to mobilize people for a better democracy, equal distribution of wealth and better public services, but exploited the discontent for narrow party interests. This alone explains why two months of demonstrations in Suleimaniya province did not spread to the other provinces of Kurdistan Region.
It is unfortunate for Kurdistan Region that a healthy opposition movement could not form at such critical period, during which, political and economic transformation could be easily realized with the driving force of public discontent brought to the arena by the opposition.
The main opposition group, Gorran, demands separation of party and government apparatus. For Gorran, such separation will remedy the corruption and clientelism in Kurdistan. This perception is profoundly misleading. In any democratic regime, government is formed by the political party that gained the majority vote at a general election. Instead of asking separation of party-government it is imperative to ask separation between the institutions of rule and of surplus appropriation.
The so-called opposition movements in Kurdistan, the Gorran, the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Komala of Islam, do not have any clear economic policies or remedies for the existing economic and political problems in Kurdistan Region. Their opposition mainly worked to diminish the power base of the two main ruling Kurdish parties, it did not try to improve standards of living or improve democracy in Kurdistan.
This failure by the opposition movement in Kurdistan caused another and more serious sin to the polity of Kurdistan: It prevents formation of a proper opposition movement that should address the problem issues in Kurdistan and bring alternative policies for public discussion and implementation.
The Kurdish opposition movement should realize that without challenging the inheritance of civil-bureaucratic state apparatus of the Baath regime, there is no short cut to solving the issues in Kurdistan.
URL of this Page;http://www.kurdishglobe.net/display-article.html?id=F86502FB4FDDF798CA224BCCABACF54A
--
Asadullah Syed
