Friday, July 1, 2011
Imran Khan Meeting with "Saints" & "Pirs" & Jang Group Promotes "SHIRK".
Imran Khan Meeting with "Saints" & "Pirs" & Jang Group Promotes "SHIRK".http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2011/07/imran-khan-meeting-with-saints-pirs.html Earlier Jang Group's Haroon Rasheed quoted Mansoor Hallaj on Osama Bin Laden whereas Osama and others like him were Ikhwanis (Jamat-e-Islami) and for them Mansoor Hallaj was an Heretic:) more shameful is the fact that Historically Mr. Haroon is wrong because there was time gap between the death of Sufi Master Junaid Baghdadi and Mansoor Hallaj and their meeting cannot be proved through any narration. Patriotic Reverse Gear of Kamran Khan & Jang Group/GEO TV. http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2011/05/patriotic-reverse-gear-of-kamran-khan.html . When you insert the patchwork of Religion in Politics these efforts always end up in more confusion:) Mr Irfan Siddiqui [Noted Columnist of Daily Jang and Mentor of Dr. Shahid Masood, and Former PRO of President House Islamabad and earlier he was a Regular Columnist of Weekly Takbeer] is quite Islamist when in Pakistan while lecturing the Pakistani Politicians about Governance and Rule and Revival of Islam whereas he hismelf relaxed Islam's very basic prinicple i.e. Tawheed Monotheism while narrating his journey of Saudi Arabia and particularly his visit of Masjid Nabawi in Medina where he literaly presented Pakistan's Case before Prophet Mohammad [PBUH]'s Grave and wanted his intercession to "SAVE PAKISTAN". Mr. Irfan Siddiqui was least bothered about a FACT that Prophet Mohammad [PBUH] had passed away more than 1400 years ago and he [PBUH] cannot help Pakistan from his grave. Period. Irfan Siddiqui's Request to Prophet Mohammad [PBUH] & Polytheism [Shirk]. http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2010/04/irfan-siddiquis-request-to-prophet.htmlToday i.e. 1st July 2011, Mr. Haroon ur Rasheed has quoted an Alleged Saint from Gojar Khan, Punjab, who was familiar with the technicalities of Military Dictatorships of General Pervez Musharraf who was supported by Imran Khan in Sham Referendum of 2002 Imran Khan's Alleged Principled Stand & General Musharraf's Fraudulent Referendum. http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2011/04/imran-khans-alleged-principled-stand.html . Friday, July 01, 2011, Rajab-Ul-Murrajab 28, 1432 A.H http://jang.com.pk/jang/jul2011-daily/01-07-2011/col4.htm The Saints of South Asian Models are as under: Iqbal's secret meeting with saints (Like Imran Khan Like Allama Iqbal (also met with a Saint) Iqbal's secret meeting with saints) URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5InKreewK1Y Excerpts are as under: The Secret Saint of Imran Khan as defined by Mr. Nusrat Javed in Express News Hidden Hands Behind Imran Khan (Courtesy: Nusrat Javed/Express News) |
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Asadullah Syed
Sharing a culture
Sharing a culture
The inspiration behind this series of articles (which appeared on the Opinion Page of Al-Ahram Weekly in the issues of 31 March, 21 April, 5 May and 9 June) was the remarkable and united effort shown by the protesters in Tahrir Square in the early days of the national uprising that started on 25 January 2011. Six months later there are incidents of sectarian strife, secularists running a "Constitution First" campaign, and Al-Azhar, the prominent seat of Sunni Islam, highlighting the need to respect freedom and human rights "as well as commitment to the principle of citizenship".
It is this last comment, made by Sheikh Ahmed El-Tayeb in the "Al-Azhar Document" on Egypt's future, that attracted my attention. Citizenship implies national identity, and national identity is not a question of nationality but of common points in people's lives -- whether national symbols, national colours, culture, cuisine, traditions or shared political objectives. Cleopatra, for example, was last in a line of ethnic Greek sovereigns and has been immortalised as a beautiful seductress, while in fact she was an intelligent and politically astute figure who fought Rome in the name of Egypt (and was, by all accounts, not especially beautiful). Another ruler, the Albanian-born soldier Mohamed Ali, created an independent Egyptian state, laid the foundations of a prosperous economy, and turned a neglected Turkish colony into an Egyptian kingdom whose power was recognised throughout the Mediterranean world. In other words, national identity is not an inborn trait. It is a sense of belonging to one country, or to one nation; a feeling that is shared with a group regardless of citizenship status.
Egypt has experienced political, economic and spiritual growth through millennia, but it has also known discrimination and corruption in one form or another. Time and again the country has been exposed to elements that have stimulated its development, changed its outlook, and even inspired styles of clothing. Yet, alongside the differences, a tradition can be traced. It is manifested in crafts such as weaving, masonry and book-binding, and there are, in addition, fundamental resemblances that stand out less vividly but which show a remarkable continuity in location, tradition and ritual.
There are places in Egypt that are traditionally regarded as holy, and which have a history of sanctity long predating monotheism. Many ancient monuments were transformed into Christian churches. In turn, mosques have been constructed on the site of former Christian chapels.
Muslims and Christians alike pay homage to the sacred sites of holy people with shared customs of preparation and ritual: tents are put around the church or tomb and the area is decorated with flags, banners and lights. The night before the moulid (annual religious festival) market stalls are set up for the sale of toys, sweets, trinkets, paper hats and books. There are swings and puppet shows for children. The highlight of the occasion is the great zaffa, a procession through the streets of a picture of the Muslim sheikh or Christian saint in whose honour the moulid is held. Some moulids, like that of St George at Mit Damsis near the Delta town of Mansoura, are shared by Muslims and Christians.
In the Delta village of Damirah is a mound called Qafr Damirah Al-Qadim ("the castle of Damirah the ancient"). It is the site where the Christian St Dimiana, along with 40 virgins, was martyred in the reign of Diocletian. Today the community is predominantly Muslim, but many of the mosques have columns and other architectural elements which attest to the earlier Christian era. The annual moulid that takes place there is no longer in honour of the 40 adolescent girls, but of 40 Muslim soldiers killed during the conquest of Egypt in 640 AD. Such overlapping traditions attest to a common legacy. Qafr Damirah Al-Qadim is associated with 40 individuals who died for a cause.
As in ancient times, both men and women pay regular visits to the tombs of their relatives, and during the Eid, the Feast at the end of the holy month of Ramadan, sacrifice a sheep and give some of its flesh, along with bread, to the poor in the locality. Who would question that such a ceremony stems from ancient expiatory sacrifice, which is today regarded as alms-giving? Or that graphic pictures of the holy pilgrimage to Mecca (by ship or air) painted on the outer walls of houses in villages and towns in Upper Egypt are not a reflection of scenes in ancient Egyptian tombs of the pilgrimage (by boat) to the holy city of Abydos?
Change and continuity are not as paradoxical as they sound. Although there are very real political, social and ideological differences between various eras of Egypt's enduring civilisation, there is also a static factor. Egyptian leadership, for example, has always been associated with that great source of life: the Nile. Through progressive civilisations efforts have been made to harness its waters. From the earliest Pharaohs who ceremoniously wielded pickaxes to open new canals, to the present day when an initiative is underway to achieve sustainable development through the equitable usage of Nile Basin water resources, faith in a leader who is a provider, protector and controller of water is a factor that has outlived change. Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, Mamluks, kings and presidents have built canals, barrages, aqueducts and dams. Following the uprising this year, one of the first steps taken by Prime Minister Essam Sharaf was to head a high-level delegation to Khartoum to consolidate relations between the two "sister countries" who share the water of the Nile.
There is a character and identity to Egypt that cannot be rendered in historical sequence because it transcends history. It has been transmitted from ancient times to the present in a stream of living culture. In accordance with Islam, which forbids the portrayal of any living likeness, there was an increasing production of abstract ornamentation in local workshops. The pottery produced in Fustat between the 11th and 15th centuries, for example, characterised by bright, glazed surfaces with a metallic lustre, was made for both Muslim and Christian patrons. Examples are on display in the Coptic Museum and in the Islamic Museum of Art and Architecture. Architectural elements that survive in mediaeval mosques and mansions are no different from the fine wooden ceilings, mashrabiya (latticed woodwork) windows, arches and tiles in geometric and non-figurative designs that are incorporated into the structure of the Old Wing of the Coptic Museum -- elements that were salvaged from derelict Coptic houses. As for textiles, those on display in the new Textile Museum in Al-Muizz Street in Cairo range from tunics of un-dyed linen with medallions and decorative borders to a variant of woollen loop weaving in which the weft is not pulled tight. This, one of the oldest and most famous of Egyptian crafts, which is used in cloaks, shirts and shawls, wall hangings, blankets and curtains made for Muslim and Coptic patrons alike. Metal lamps, perfume vessels, even eye paint -- all point to a shared tradition.
When it comes to religion, among both Christians and Muslims there is a strong tradition that supports the New Testament story of the Flight into Egypt. Some 22 sites in Egypt are associated with the event, and although Copts and Muslims are not always in agreement on the route taken by the Holy Family or on the duration of their stay in Egypt (Copts believe that it was for a little over three and a half years, while Muslims hold that it was seven) there are many sites where the tradition is upheld by both. Both Muslims and Christians, for example, relate that the Holy Family was warmly received at the Delta city of Belbeis, and that the inhabitants kept company with the Virgin, played with the child, and talked to Joseph Al-Naggar (the carpenter). There was once a tree in the city which after the visit became known as the Virgin Mary's Tree. It was reputedly cut down by Napoleon's soldiers in search of firewood. However, near the spot where it is believed to have stood at the crossroads of Ansari and Boghdadi streets, the mosque of Osman Al-Haress Al-Ansari stands today, built in commemoration of the visit.
East of Bahnasa, at the site of the ancient city of Oxyrhynchus -- which was largely Christian in the fifth century but is today predominantly Muslim -- local sheikhs quote a passage from the Quran (XXIII: 50) which roughly translates: "... and we have made the son of Mary and his mother a portent, and we gave them refuge on a height, a place of flocks and water-springs." They claim that Jesus attended school at Bahnasa and refer to the Arab historian Mohamed Al-Bakir (676-731) as their source.
Shared traditions and a common language point to a common patrimony. There is a Coptic-Arabic culture in Egypt, and it is surely timely to rewrite school textbooks for the rising generation to include the overlapping, and sometimes complex, coexistence between Muslims and Christians for the last 14 centuries.
The author's book Christianity in the Land of the Pharaohs was published by Routledge in the UK and USA in 2002.
URL of this Page: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1054/op1.htm
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Asadullah Syed
Thursday, June 30, 2011
From Textbook to Tahrir Square
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Asadullah Syed
Taliban talks bombing
Taliban talks bombing
Administration negotiates with Afghan enemy despite brutal attack
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
The Obama administration has confirmed that talks are under way with the Taliban to seek a diplomatic settlement in Afghanistan prior to the departure of coalition troops. The same Taliban conducted a spectacular assault late Tuesday on the InterContinental Hotel in Kabul. Seven suicide bombers and snipers killed 11 people. The attackers also died, some by design, the last three shot down on the hotel roof by NATO helicopters.
It would be reasonable to conclude from this brutal incident that the Taliban are more interested in coalition capitulation than peace. They share President Obama's objective of having foreign troops depart Afghanistan, but they would rather push them out than invite them to leave. If the enemy reduced the number and scope of their attacks the political case for a quick pullout would be more palatable. Instead, they're amplifying the violence. Mr. Obama refuses to discuss the concept of victory in Afghanistan; the Taliban are seeking a win.
This was no random attack by rogue elements in the Taliban camp. Reportedly the diplomatic team led by U.S. special envoy Ambassador Marc Grossman, who had met earlier with President Hamid Karzai, was the target. Even this degree of Taliban contempt for diplomatic immunity will not derail the detente. The consensus opinion seems to be that the road to a peace agreement is a bumpy one, and events like this should be expected along the way.
Such a response is nothing new. In late 1967, the State Department received a communique from the National Liberation Front (NLF), the Viet Cong's political wing with whom the Johnson administration was desperate to negotiate. They said they were willing to discuss prisoner exchanges and broader issues but "now is not the right time to talk peace." The State Department interpreted this message to mean that the NLF in fact did want to discuss peace but was playing hard to get. In fact, the communist diplomatic feelers were a ruse in advance of the 1968 Tet Offensive. The offensive failed, and the severely bloodied enemy was driven to the negotiation table as a last resort. Days before peace talks opened in Paris in May 1968 the communists launched an attack that became known as "Little Tet," and despite the name, that month saw more U.S. deaths in Vietnam than any other.
Less sophisticated leaders might view a large-scale attack just days before a peace conference opens as evidence of bad faith. They might call the talks off, ramp up the "kinetic action" and show the enemy some backbone. The Johnson administration had been so anxious to engage in negotiations that the talks opened as scheduled, and then dragged on inconclusively for years. Expect the same from the Obama administration. Events like the InterContinental attack will not be allowed to get in the way of a settlement so Mr. Obama can bring this "war of necessity" to a quick close. The lesson to the Taliban will be that the Americans will pay any price, bear any burden, to be done with this war and get out. Lacking such sophistication, the Taliban still believe in old-fashioned concepts like winning.
URL of this Page: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jun/29/taliban-talks-bombing/--
Asadullah Syed
Experts urge CBN to promote capital re purposing, not Islamic banking
Experts urge CBN to promote capital re purposing, not Islamic banking
By Kingsley Ighomwenghian, Finance Editor
• Muoghalu (left) and Johnson listening attentively during the seminar
Kingsley Moughalu, deputy governor, Financial System Stability, at the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) had an arduous task mid last week in Lagos, as he tried to convince bankers, lawyers, and finance experts, among others, who gathered in Lagos to discuss the CBN guidelines on the proposed Islamic Banking framework.
It was at a seminar on "repurposing capital: non-interest banking" co-sponsored by Apostles in the Market Place (AiMP), a network of Christian professionals and leaders, and BusinessDay Media Limited publishers of BusinessDay newspapers.
Facilitators and participants (based on the barrage of questions), insisted that because Nigeria remains a secular state, there is no room for guideline suggestive of any religious inclinations or practice. The CBN Act, they stressed, does not empower the apex bank to engage in Islamic banking, besides the fact that non-interest banking, which falls under specialised banking, as recognised by the Banks and Other Financial Institution's Act (BOFIA), is not a leeway for promotion of any religious practice.
Kingsley Muoghalu, Deputy Governor, Financial System Stability, at the CBN, in his presentation however insisted that the CBN reviewed the initial guidelines released in January this year taking note of issues raised by various stakeholders, while stressing that the apex bank is under obligation to license banks that meet set conditions. Just as in the conventional banks, Islamic banks with national spread have a capital requirement of N10 billion, while a regional license attracts N5 billion.
The CBN, Muoghalu said, should be commended for bowing to superior arguments and admitting that "the first guidelines had a fundamental error," following which it was reviewed by the apex bank's committee of governors.
While calling for submission of other models of non-interest banking outside the Islamic one which is well known and practice globally, Muoghalu, a lawyer, stressed that the CBN was acting within its powers. The Islamic banking guidelines, he continued, is still part of ongoing reforms leading to the cancellation of universal banking licenses, because the model has not worked well. Universal banking, he added, encouraged the aggregation of risk by the banks, without contributing adequately to national development.
Non-interest or Islamic banking, Muoghalu noted, is part of efforts to attract more of Nigeria's bankable population into the system, lamenting the situation where almost 50 per cent adults in the country are not within the system.
"There is no need to entertain exaggerated fears," he said, assuring that the CBN will pursue financial inclusion.
A communiqué at the end of the seminar made available to our correspondent, wondered why it took the apex bank six months to recognise the glaring error in the January 2011 guidelines issued on the Non-Interest Financial Institutions (NIFI), whose "framework was limited in its application as it equated NIB (Non-Interest Banking) to Islamic Banking, in effect barring potential non-Muslim or non-Shariah compliant investors and participants from tapping into the benefits of NIB."
Moreover, they continued, "the framework clearly demanded that NIFI "transacts banking business, etc... and commercial activities as well as the provision of financial products and services in accordance with Shariah principles and rules of Islamic commercial jurisprudence". It also prescribed that prospective NIB operators specify in their memorandum and article of incorporation that "their business operations will be conducted according with Shariah principles and practices", and that "all licensed NIFIs shall have an internal Shariah compliance review mechanism and a Shariah Advisory Committee (SAC) as part of their governance structure". These and similar elements of the new framework needed to be changed."
The new framework re-issued on Tuesday, June 21, 2011, according to the communiqué is not fail-safe however, as it still recognises that "Islamic banking is only one aspect of NIB and now recognises 'Other Non Interest Financial Institutions' to accommodate other NIB models whether faith-based or otherwise."
While noting that the seminar organisers are willing to work with the apex bank in developing a better framework, the participants urged the CBN to "consult more broadly in developing an enhanced banking and investing framework. Such framework should, in addition to the expected banking supervisory items such as solvency, capital adequacy, adequate risk management, transparent reporting, have" elements like:
• A broader framework that accommodates all faiths, hence name a change in the name to Profit and Loss Sharing Bank, as provided for by BOFIA, or Faith-Based Financing (FBF).
• Adopting "values-" as well as "law-driven" approach should be adopted with elements such as:
i. Fairness: transparency and social justice
ii. Social well-being: prohibition of certain types of transactions (like gambling, derivatives, etc.)
iii. Zero-to-appropriate interest rate: returns based on wealth-generating investments
iv. Shared risk and profits: one party does not benefit at the expense of the other
v. Contractual clarity and certainty: elimination of ambiguities, enabling non-sophisticated investors/customers transact banking and investment business with trust and transparency
vi. Discouragement of consumer debt
c. The framework should recognize multiple tiers of FBF institutions based on level of adherence to the above listed FBF values.
i. Totally Non-interest: clarity and transparency about zero interest in this category with no hidden charges.
ii. Appropriate Interest: a constrained interest rate, based o a variety of factors to be agreed upon in the guidelines.
The participants agreed however that if properly regulated and administered, the NIB and FBF, "have the potential to transform the economies of underdeveloped communities, hence is a welcome development in Nigeria where on-going banking reforms have made interest-charging deposit money banks more risk averse and perhaps unwilling to venture into virgin frontiers in banking. The unbanked and under-banked in Nigeria will benefit from FBF where risk and returns are shared between provider and user of financing. There is however need for a supervisory framework that recognises the peculiarities, applicability and potential of FBF including the following:
a. Stimulating grassroots, relationally-based investing (versus debt-based financing)
b. Countering corruption through transparency and other faith-based financing (FBF) principles
c. Avoiding speculative bubbles and decreasing reckless investing
d. Avoiding consumer and other debt that is detached from real assets and initiatives."
Eghes Eyieyien, chief executive, Pharez Limited, a Lagos-based risk management, ratings, consulting, human capital development & training, and investment firm, who was lead speaker at the seminar insisted in his presentation, for example, that "the CBN cannot use a guideline to change the law, (and that) the CBN is not the National Assembly. The CBN lawyers should go back and look at the guidelines again, because you cannot use a small provision in BOFIA that gives you the power to regulate to begin to legislate."
Continuing, he advised that "if Islamic banking must happen, the CBN should send a draft bill to the National Assembly."
According to him, "the NIFI Framework stated that: "A Non-Interest Financial Institution (NIFI) means a bank or Other Financial Institution (OFI) under the purview of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), which transacts banking business, engages in trading, investment and commercial activities as well as the provision of financial products and services in accordance with Shariah principles and rules of Islamic commercial jurisprudence." The Glossary of Terms of the CBN's NIFI Framework states that: Shariah Principles refers to "the divine guidance as given by the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet and embodies all aspects of the Islamic faith, including beliefs and practices".
"The only legally valid definition is stated in Section 61 of the (BOFIA) of 1991 which speaks of a "Profit and Loss Sharing Bank". That is, "a bank which transacts investment or commercial banking business and maintains profits and loss sharing accounts". Profit and Loss Banking has always been the interpretation and understanding of Non-Interest Financial Services in Nigeria. When the CBN granted an Approval-in-Principle Licence to Jaiz International Bank Plc in 2004 while Chief Joseph Sanusi was the CBN Governor, the licence was issued for it to carry on business as a Profit and Loss Sharing Bank. Curiously, the present CBN Governor, Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, was widely reported in the mass media to have announced on Monday, 20th June, 2011, at a Conference on Islamic Banking in Dakar, Senegal, that the CBN had issued(?) Jaiz International Bank Plc an Approval-in-Principle as the "first Islamic Bank in the country". Jaiz Bank was unable to operate as a Profit and Loss Sharing Bank, not because there was no Islamic Banking Guideline, but simply because it was unable to raise the minimum capital requirement of N25 billion. The CBN has now inexplicably lowered the capital requirement for Islamic Banks to just N10 billion to achieve "National Bank" status as against the N25 billion it stipulated for Deposit Money Banks. Why is the Sanusi Lamido Sanusi-led CBN unduly eager to make life easier for Jaiz International Bank and other proposed Islamic Banks?"
Fielding questions from participants at the seminar, Muoghalu called for submission of other models of non-interest banking, arguing that the Islamic type is the one that is well known and practiced across the globe even in the UK, insisting that the CBN is acting within its powers, since the guidelines is part of ongoing reforms leading to the cancellation of universal banking licenses, because the model has not worked well. Universal banking, he added, encouraged the aggregation of risk by the banks, without contributing adequately to national development.
The Deputy Governor expressed worry at the way in which the proposed licensing of Islamic banking is being tied to Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, the CBN Governor being a Muslim. The process began in 2008 with the formation of the Islamic Finance Working Group with representatives from the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), Debt Management Office and the CBN (under Chukwuma Soludo, a Christian) as observer. Nigeria, he added, joined the Islamic Financial Services Board also in 2008 and formally admitted early in 2009 before the current CBN Governor assumed office.
He noted that the CBN under Sanusi remains passionate about the nation's financial system and the need to effectively intermediate in all aspects of the economy. This zeal, he stressed, has resulted in the ongoing banking reforms, the SME and power sectors, in a bid to ensure long-term loans at single digits to operators in the real sectors of the economy, as part of the CBN's mandate.
Firing back, Eyienyen stressed: "It will be disingenuous for anybody to say we are concluding what Soludo started. I am surprised as to why it is the CBN Governor and not the DMO that is talking about sukuk (Islamic or non-interest bonds). What is the inordinate drive to set up Islamic banking," he wondered.
He noted that his disagreement with the proposal is out of professionalism and about the law, rather than just blowing empty air, wondering why the same amount of passion and priority has not been invested in the Small and Medium Enterprises Equity Investment Scheme (SMEEIS), which was made optional after five years of being compulsory.
In his presentation earlier, Bett Johnson, another facilitator, author and Founder, of Califonia-based Institute for Innovation, Integration and Impact, while praising the CBN for the political will to embark on the stress testing in 2009 and even delving into alternative financing models, noted that faith based financing encourages good business practice, forgiveness and reduction in greed.
He however warned that practitioners must be regulated from within Nigeria and not by a body of non-Nigerians, or people resident outside of the country, in view of the lack of adequate capacity and competence. He made this observation against the backdrop of a provision in the guideline for a body of experts to advise the CBN on the practice of Islamic banking.
Speaking at the weekend in Ilorin, Kwara State however, Deputy Governor, Economic Policy of CBN, Mrs. Sarah Alade, told newsmen at a retreat for the Financial Market Department that apart from the Islamic banking, there are other forms of non-interest banking for which interested parties can get licence.
Issuing a licences to operate Islamic banks, she told participants at the retreat with the theme: "Transforming the Nigerian Financial Market: Prospects and Challenges," does not translate to Islamising Nigeria. The CBN, she added, is interest in changing the face of banking for economy for the betterment of Nigerians.
Rather than base the guidelines on provisions of any religion, Brett wants the apex bank to incline towards universal truths, focused on benefits to the society, rather than being specific to one particular faith.
According to him, "we should go beyond Islamic banking, (which) has not necessarily produced good returns. Islamic banking in the UK has been a huge flop. The fact that there is a Christian name on a bank does not make it better than any other one. Nigeria should go for the bigger picture, not Islamic, or non-interest banking, but go for a full repurposing of capital."
Conclusion
According to Kayode Ogundamisi, a blogger, "if it is Islamic banking because Holy Quran (in Chap 2 verses 228, 275 and 280) advised against giving loans with interest, it may as well be termed Christian banking since the Holy Bible (in Psalm 15 verse 5, and Deuteronomy 23:19) is equally against 'usury' (interest). Stop the bigotry."
URL of this Page: http://www.independentngonline.com/DailyIndependent/Article.aspx?id=36304
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Asadullah Syed
Sunday, May 1, 2011
Inheritance and opposition
01 May 2011
Globe Editorial
By Azad Amin
The political entity in Kurdistan Region came as a result of internal and external factors in 1992, and inherited economic and political artifacts of the former Baathist regime. The artificial creation of an Iraqi state apparatus, combined with ethnic and religious heterogeneity, produced an extremely refractory inheritance for state-building. The problem of state-building was put in a contemptuous tone by King Faisal in 1933 and depicts the 20th century's repressive regime in Iraq: "In Iraq, there is still no Iraqi people, but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic ideal, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatsoever."
Following the 1958 Revolution, which overthrew the monarchy and instituted a republic, the landed political class was replaced by civil and military bureaucratic class in control of state apparatus. Monopolization of state apparatus by this new class, under a charismatic leader, was the prime reason for the emergence of state-based clientelism and formation of bureaucratic control organized by the civil- military apparatus. So, the primary functions of the state apparatus have been the consolidation of its rule over and against the other segments of society whether ethnic, class or religious. This was in parallel with strict state control and mobilization of economic resources for state-led economic development. The Baath regime had tight control over social, political and economic life, with a driving ideology of Arab nationalism. This translates to the Sunni assertion in a state where they were significantly outnumbered.
Such main characteristics of the Baath regime, which is not unique to Iraq but can be applied to the most of the regimes in the Middle East, explains the lack of democracy in the region. The development of liberal democracy requires two fundamental preconditions: A significant degree of separation between the institutions of rule and of surplus appropriation, and the ability of the state to uphold its authority against other sites of political command. These two preconditions have been absent not only in Iraq but much of the region.
What was inherited in post-Baath Iraq was a highly bureaucratized state apparatus. The political entity in Kurdistan region since 1992, and the political entity of Iraq in post-Saddam era, faced this serious dilemma to deal with the bureaucratic character of the regime that they inherited.
From 1992 to 2003, the Kurdistan Regional Government, due to limited economic resources and its fragile political existence ― its unrecognized de facto existence combined with unfriendly neighbors due to the Kurdish national question for these neighbors ― failed to fight against the bureaucratic nature of the regime it inherited. The ensuing internal conflict between the two main Kurdish political parties further increased party-based clientelism. What we see in Kurdistan Region during this period was the transformation from state-based clientelism to party-based clientelism within the framework of limited economic resources. This constrained both development of democracy and the formation of a liberal market economy in the region.
What differentiated the Kurdish polity form that of the former Baathist regime is the development of democratic space for other ethnic and religious minorities in Kurdistan. Ethnic and religious minorities in Kurdistan enjoyed and exercised their democratic rights fully, without restrictions. Minority and religious rights in Kurdistan can be compared with European standards, not with the other regional regimes.
Following the demise of the Baath regime, structural alterations fundamentally changed the polity and economy of Kurdistan Region. Consolidation of its political status by the new Iraqi constitution and highly efficient stability and security of Kurdistan opened the door for foreign investment and capital to use Kurdistan as a gateway to the rest of Iraq. Regular income from the Iraqi budget (17 percent) to Kurdistan Region provided better opportunities and resources for the KRG to consolidate its power and status.
The expansion of economic resources, such as an allocated share of the Iraqi budget, foreign capital and investment in the region, which led to an economic boom in Kurdistan, became sources of both economic development and apprehension as the distribution of wealth was not equal.
Whether on purpose or not, KRG's economic policies opened the door for capital accumulation geared toward creating a homemade bourgeoisie and entrepreneurs, alongside a growing middle class in the Region. Along with influx of capital and growing economic resources, party-based clientelism strengthened and capital accumulation was mostly based on this clientelism.
KRG not only failed to eliminate party-based clientelism but also to a certain degree failed to deliver basic public services, such as electricity and clean water. Inequalities in the distribution of wealth, lack of sufficient public services, and lack of equal opportunities became sources of public apprehension towards the ruling elite in Kurdistan.
A proper opposition movement with clear political and economic strategy could have easily mobilized such general public discontent towards radical reforms and improvement of democracy in Kurdistan. What the existing opposition in Kurdistan did was not to mobilize people for a better democracy, equal distribution of wealth and better public services, but exploited the discontent for narrow party interests. This alone explains why two months of demonstrations in Suleimaniya province did not spread to the other provinces of Kurdistan Region.
It is unfortunate for Kurdistan Region that a healthy opposition movement could not form at such critical period, during which, political and economic transformation could be easily realized with the driving force of public discontent brought to the arena by the opposition.
The main opposition group, Gorran, demands separation of party and government apparatus. For Gorran, such separation will remedy the corruption and clientelism in Kurdistan. This perception is profoundly misleading. In any democratic regime, government is formed by the political party that gained the majority vote at a general election. Instead of asking separation of party-government it is imperative to ask separation between the institutions of rule and of surplus appropriation.
The so-called opposition movements in Kurdistan, the Gorran, the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Komala of Islam, do not have any clear economic policies or remedies for the existing economic and political problems in Kurdistan Region. Their opposition mainly worked to diminish the power base of the two main ruling Kurdish parties, it did not try to improve standards of living or improve democracy in Kurdistan.
This failure by the opposition movement in Kurdistan caused another and more serious sin to the polity of Kurdistan: It prevents formation of a proper opposition movement that should address the problem issues in Kurdistan and bring alternative policies for public discussion and implementation.
The Kurdish opposition movement should realize that without challenging the inheritance of civil-bureaucratic state apparatus of the Baath regime, there is no short cut to solving the issues in Kurdistan.
URL of this Page;http://www.kurdishglobe.net/display-article.html?id=F86502FB4FDDF798CA224BCCABACF54A
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Asadullah Syed




