Sharing a culture

In this fifth and final article of the series, Jill Kamil takes a look at national identity

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The inspiration behind this series of articles (which appeared on the Opinion Page of Al-Ahram Weekly in the issues of 31 March, 21 April, 5 May and 9 June) was the remarkable and united effort shown by the protesters in Tahrir Square in the early days of the national uprising that started on 25 January 2011. Six months later there are incidents of sectarian strife, secularists running a "Constitution First" campaign, and Al-Azhar, the prominent seat of Sunni Islam, highlighting the need to respect freedom and human rights "as well as commitment to the principle of citizenship".

It is this last comment, made by Sheikh Ahmed El-Tayeb in the "Al-Azhar Document" on Egypt's future, that attracted my attention. Citizenship implies national identity, and national identity is not a question of nationality but of common points in people's lives -- whether national symbols, national colours, culture, cuisine, traditions or shared political objectives. Cleopatra, for example, was last in a line of ethnic Greek sovereigns and has been immortalised as a beautiful seductress, while in fact she was an intelligent and politically astute figure who fought Rome in the name of Egypt (and was, by all accounts, not especially beautiful). Another ruler, the Albanian-born soldier Mohamed Ali, created an independent Egyptian state, laid the foundations of a prosperous economy, and turned a neglected Turkish colony into an Egyptian kingdom whose power was recognised throughout the Mediterranean world. In other words, national identity is not an inborn trait. It is a sense of belonging to one country, or to one nation; a feeling that is shared with a group regardless of citizenship status.

Egypt has experienced political, economic and spiritual growth through millennia, but it has also known discrimination and corruption in one form or another. Time and again the country has been exposed to elements that have stimulated its development, changed its outlook, and even inspired styles of clothing. Yet, alongside the differences, a tradition can be traced. It is manifested in crafts such as weaving, masonry and book-binding, and there are, in addition, fundamental resemblances that stand out less vividly but which show a remarkable continuity in location, tradition and ritual.

There are places in Egypt that are traditionally regarded as holy, and which have a history of sanctity long predating monotheism. Many ancient monuments were transformed into Christian churches. In turn, mosques have been constructed on the site of former Christian chapels.

Muslims and Christians alike pay homage to the sacred sites of holy people with shared customs of preparation and ritual: tents are put around the church or tomb and the area is decorated with flags, banners and lights. The night before the moulid (annual religious festival) market stalls are set up for the sale of toys, sweets, trinkets, paper hats and books. There are swings and puppet shows for children. The highlight of the occasion is the great zaffa, a procession through the streets of a picture of the Muslim sheikh or Christian saint in whose honour the moulid is held. Some moulids, like that of St George at Mit Damsis near the Delta town of Mansoura, are shared by Muslims and Christians.

In the Delta village of Damirah is a mound called Qafr Damirah Al-Qadim ("the castle of Damirah the ancient"). It is the site where the Christian St Dimiana, along with 40 virgins, was martyred in the reign of Diocletian. Today the community is predominantly Muslim, but many of the mosques have columns and other architectural elements which attest to the earlier Christian era. The annual moulid that takes place there is no longer in honour of the 40 adolescent girls, but of 40 Muslim soldiers killed during the conquest of Egypt in 640 AD. Such overlapping traditions attest to a common legacy. Qafr Damirah Al-Qadim is associated with 40 individuals who died for a cause.

As in ancient times, both men and women pay regular visits to the tombs of their relatives, and during the Eid, the Feast at the end of the holy month of Ramadan, sacrifice a sheep and give some of its flesh, along with bread, to the poor in the locality. Who would question that such a ceremony stems from ancient expiatory sacrifice, which is today regarded as alms-giving? Or that graphic pictures of the holy pilgrimage to Mecca (by ship or air) painted on the outer walls of houses in villages and towns in Upper Egypt are not a reflection of scenes in ancient Egyptian tombs of the pilgrimage (by boat) to the holy city of Abydos?

Change and continuity are not as paradoxical as they sound. Although there are very real political, social and ideological differences between various eras of Egypt's enduring civilisation, there is also a static factor. Egyptian leadership, for example, has always been associated with that great source of life: the Nile. Through progressive civilisations efforts have been made to harness its waters. From the earliest Pharaohs who ceremoniously wielded pickaxes to open new canals, to the present day when an initiative is underway to achieve sustainable development through the equitable usage of Nile Basin water resources, faith in a leader who is a provider, protector and controller of water is a factor that has outlived change. Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, Mamluks, kings and presidents have built canals, barrages, aqueducts and dams. Following the uprising this year, one of the first steps taken by Prime Minister Essam Sharaf was to head a high-level delegation to Khartoum to consolidate relations between the two "sister countries" who share the water of the Nile.

There is a character and identity to Egypt that cannot be rendered in historical sequence because it transcends history. It has been transmitted from ancient times to the present in a stream of living culture. In accordance with Islam, which forbids the portrayal of any living likeness, there was an increasing production of abstract ornamentation in local workshops. The pottery produced in Fustat between the 11th and 15th centuries, for example, characterised by bright, glazed surfaces with a metallic lustre, was made for both Muslim and Christian patrons. Examples are on display in the Coptic Museum and in the Islamic Museum of Art and Architecture. Architectural elements that survive in mediaeval mosques and mansions are no different from the fine wooden ceilings, mashrabiya (latticed woodwork) windows, arches and tiles in geometric and non-figurative designs that are incorporated into the structure of the Old Wing of the Coptic Museum -- elements that were salvaged from derelict Coptic houses. As for textiles, those on display in the new Textile Museum in Al-Muizz Street in Cairo range from tunics of un-dyed linen with medallions and decorative borders to a variant of woollen loop weaving in which the weft is not pulled tight. This, one of the oldest and most famous of Egyptian crafts, which is used in cloaks, shirts and shawls, wall hangings, blankets and curtains made for Muslim and Coptic patrons alike. Metal lamps, perfume vessels, even eye paint -- all point to a shared tradition.

When it comes to religion, among both Christians and Muslims there is a strong tradition that supports the New Testament story of the Flight into Egypt. Some 22 sites in Egypt are associated with the event, and although Copts and Muslims are not always in agreement on the route taken by the Holy Family or on the duration of their stay in Egypt (Copts believe that it was for a little over three and a half years, while Muslims hold that it was seven) there are many sites where the tradition is upheld by both. Both Muslims and Christians, for example, relate that the Holy Family was warmly received at the Delta city of Belbeis, and that the inhabitants kept company with the Virgin, played with the child, and talked to Joseph Al-Naggar (the carpenter). There was once a tree in the city which after the visit became known as the Virgin Mary's Tree. It was reputedly cut down by Napoleon's soldiers in search of firewood. However, near the spot where it is believed to have stood at the crossroads of Ansari and Boghdadi streets, the mosque of Osman Al-Haress Al-Ansari stands today, built in commemoration of the visit.

East of Bahnasa, at the site of the ancient city of Oxyrhynchus -- which was largely Christian in the fifth century but is today predominantly Muslim -- local sheikhs quote a passage from the Quran (XXIII: 50) which roughly translates: "... and we have made the son of Mary and his mother a portent, and we gave them refuge on a height, a place of flocks and water-springs." They claim that Jesus attended school at Bahnasa and refer to the Arab historian Mohamed Al-Bakir (676-731) as their source.

Shared traditions and a common language point to a common patrimony. There is a Coptic-Arabic culture in Egypt, and it is surely timely to rewrite school textbooks for the rising generation to include the overlapping, and sometimes complex, coexistence between Muslims and Christians for the last 14 centuries.

The author's book Christianity in the Land of the Pharaohs was published by Routledge in the UK and USA in 2002.

URL of this Page: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1054/op1.htm

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Asadullah Syed

From Textbook to Tahrir Square

From Textbook to Tahrir Square Written by David E. Miller Published Wednesday, June 29, 2011

Experts assert the cradle of the Arab Spring was in school reading assignments Facebook was the medium for spreading the word of rebellion in the Arab Spring, but it was school textbooks – the required reading from early childhood through the teen years that informs children of who they are and where they come from – that may have been the source of alienation that drove young people into the street. That's what some scholars meeting in Jerusalem said at the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace in Jerusalem on Wednesday, as they reviewed the lessons students pick up from reading history, literature, civics and other subjects. "Arab school textbooks are unable to address inner diversities within societies," Falk Pingel, a consultant and research fellow at Germany's Georg Eckert Institute, which researches textbooks, told The Media Line. "They convey a homogeneous image of society which doesn't fit the reality." School systems across the Arab world are usually faulted for their poor performance in creating graduates with the math, science and other skills needed for the modern job market. But a critical study of the region's textbook reveal they are also failing in the much more basic function of creating informed and educated citizens. Schools have an outside role in the Middle and North Africa, where some 60% of the region's population is under 30 years of age. Governments spend about 20% of their budgets on education, but drop-out rates are high, scores on international exams are low and some 30% of the region's population can't read or write. Even from a young age, students easily see the discrepancy between what their history and civics classes teach and the reality around them, leading them initially to be skeptical of their teachers and school and eventually of their government and leaders. "The growing divide between reality and the books is cited as one of the reasons for the Arab revolutions," Pingel said. Syria, a dictatorship that has been wracked by unrest since the middle of March, is a potpourri of Sunni Muslims, Alawites, Druze and Christians. But the ruling Baath party is ideologically committed to pan-Arabism and fears the divides could undermine political stability. As a result, said experts at the conference, Syrian history textbooks that make no mention of the country's ethnic and religious divisions, even though every child knows his family's identity. Monika Bolliger, a researcher from the University of Zurich who studies Syrian textbooks, said the uprising in Syria displayed sectarian undertones that highlighted the failure of the state to create an inclusive Arab identity. The Syrian students she interviewed ridiculed their educational system. "They think its nonsense," she told The Media Line. "Syrians often make jokes about their educational system, mocking the slogans and the propaganda."   Arab school curriculum is highly centralized, uniform, and focused on repetition rather than innovation, said Dr. Achim Rohde, a researcher at the German University of Marburg who studies Iraqi textbooks. In an attempt to avoid dealing with politically contentious issues, Iraqi school curriculum ignores the country's history since 1958, when the Hashemite king was toppled in a violent rebellion. Since then it has been ruled by a succession of Baath rulers, the last of whom, Saddam Hussein, was ousted by allied forces in 2003. The allies tried to solve Iraq's problem of sectarian divisions by removing all references to minorities in textbook, including favorable mention of Shiite religious doctrine that Saddam had order inserted during the 1990s as he sought to curry their favor. That, said Rohde, erased a source of inter-communal understanding. "Textbooks are part of the problem of sectarianism," Rohde said. Textbooks can be turned into part of the solution but only if they included historical examples of inter-sectarian cooperation, he added. Even then, the transition is difficult and takes time. Although Tunisia had the most progressive and developed educational system, it was the first Arab country to experience a revolution because its reforms were insufficient Bolliger of the University of Zurich said educated Syrians' skepticism of formal education was part of a broader cynicism towards official narratives perpetuated by governments about history and society, depicted as well in mainstream media. But not everyone is convinced that textbooks play such a prominent role. Nathan Brown, a political scientist at George Washington University, said academic researchers are attracted to them as shapers of society and attitudes because they are readily available and universally read. But, he said, they aren't necessarily the best indicators of the nature of a given society. Although politically and ideologically divided, Gaza and the West Bank use the same textbooks, said Brown. In the rigid Palestinian educational system, careful study of textbooks was more important for teachers than for students. "There is very little freedom [for teachers] in the classroom," he told The Media Line. In Saudi Arabia, a highly conservative Islamic society, textbooks portray the country as a part of the "global village" and women as having rights and freedoms they lack in reality, Eleanor Doumato, a retired researcher of Saudi textbooks at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University in the U.S. told The Media Line. But, she stressed, the problem isn't textbooks, which nowhere in the world show authentic representations of the societies they write about, but what those in power would like their societies to be. The problem isn't the books but the governments that sponsor them. "Civics textbooks portray an idealized version of society," Doumato told The Media Line. "The problem is that in Saudi Arabia, although revered, the educators themselves are uneducated."

URL of this Page: http://www.themedialine.org/news/news_detail.asp?NewsID=32569

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Asadullah Syed

Taliban talks bombing

Administration negotiates with Afghan enemy despite brutal attack

By THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

The Obama administration has confirmed that talks are under way with the Taliban to seek a diplomatic settlement in Afghanistan prior to the departure of coalition troops. The same Taliban conducted a spectacular assault late Tuesday on the InterContinental Hotel in Kabul. Seven suicide bombers and snipers killed 11 people. The attackers also died, some by design, the last three shot down on the hotel roof by NATO helicopters.

It would be reasonable to conclude from this brutal incident that the Taliban are more interested in coalition capitulation than peace. They share President Obama's objective of having foreign troops depart Afghanistan, but they would rather push them out than invite them to leave. If the enemy reduced the number and scope of their attacks the political case for a quick pullout would be more palatable. Instead, they're amplifying the violence. Mr. Obama refuses to discuss the concept of victory in Afghanistan; the Taliban are seeking a win.

This was no random attack by rogue elements in the Taliban camp. Reportedly the diplomatic team led by U.S. special envoy Ambassador Marc Grossman, who had met earlier with President Hamid Karzai, was the target. Even this degree of Taliban contempt for diplomatic immunity will not derail the detente. The consensus opinion seems to be that the road to a peace agreement is a bumpy one, and events like this should be expected along the way.

Such a response is nothing new. In late 1967, the State Department received a communique from the National Liberation Front (NLF), the Viet Cong's political wing with whom the Johnson administration was desperate to negotiate. They said they were willing to discuss prisoner exchanges and broader issues but "now is not the right time to talk peace." The State Department interpreted this message to mean that the NLF in fact did want to discuss peace but was playing hard to get. In fact, the communist diplomatic feelers were a ruse in advance of the 1968 Tet Offensive. The offensive failed, and the severely bloodied enemy was driven to the negotiation table as a last resort. Days before peace talks opened in Paris in May 1968 the communists launched an attack that became known as "Little Tet," and despite the name, that month saw more U.S. deaths in Vietnam than any other.

Less sophisticated leaders might view a large-scale attack just days before a peace conference opens as evidence of bad faith. They might call the talks off, ramp up the "kinetic action" and show the enemy some backbone. The Johnson administration had been so anxious to engage in negotiations that the talks opened as scheduled, and then dragged on inconclusively for years. Expect the same from the Obama administration. Events like the InterContinental attack will not be allowed to get in the way of a settlement so Mr. Obama can bring this "war of necessity" to a quick close. The lesson to the Taliban will be that the Americans will pay any price, bear any burden, to be done with this war and get out. Lacking such sophistication, the Taliban still believe in old-fashioned concepts like winning.

URL of this Page: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jun/29/taliban-talks-bombing/

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Asadullah Syed

Experts urge CBN to promote capital re purposing, not Islamic banking

Experts urge CBN to promote capital re purposing, not Islamic banking
By Kingsley Ighomwenghian, Finance Editor

 

• Muoghalu (left) and Johnson listening attentively during the seminar

 

Kingsley Moughalu, deputy governor, Financial System Stability, at the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) had an arduous task mid last week in Lagos, as he tried to convince bankers, lawyers, and finance experts, among others, who gathered in Lagos to discuss the CBN guidelines on the proposed Islamic Banking framework.

It was at a seminar on "repurposing capital: non-interest banking" co-sponsored by Apostles in the Market Place (AiMP), a network of Christian professionals and leaders, and BusinessDay Media Limited publishers of BusinessDay newspapers.

Facilitators and participants (based on the barrage of questions), insisted that because Nigeria remains a secular state, there is no room for guideline suggestive of any religious inclinations or practice. The CBN Act, they stressed, does not empower the apex bank to engage in Islamic banking, besides the fact that non-interest banking, which falls under specialised banking, as recognised by the Banks and Other Financial Institution's Act (BOFIA), is not a leeway for promotion of any religious practice.

Kingsley Muoghalu, Deputy Governor, Financial System Stability, at the CBN, in his presentation however insisted that the CBN reviewed the initial guidelines released in January this year taking note of issues raised by various stakeholders, while stressing that the apex bank is under obligation to license banks that meet set conditions. Just as in the conventional banks, Islamic banks with national spread have a capital requirement of N10 billion, while a regional license attracts N5 billion.

The CBN, Muoghalu said, should be commended for bowing to superior arguments and admitting that "the first guidelines had a fundamental error," following which it was reviewed by the apex bank's committee of governors. 

While calling for submission of other models of non-interest banking outside the Islamic one which is well known and practice globally, Muoghalu, a lawyer, stressed that the CBN was acting within its powers. The Islamic banking guidelines, he continued, is still part of ongoing reforms leading to the cancellation of universal banking licenses, because the model has not worked well. Universal banking, he added, encouraged the aggregation of risk by the banks, without contributing adequately to national development.

Non-interest or Islamic banking, Muoghalu noted, is part of efforts to attract more of Nigeria's bankable population into the system, lamenting the situation where almost 50 per cent adults in the country are not within the system.

"There is no need to entertain exaggerated fears," he said, assuring that the CBN will pursue financial inclusion.

A communiqué at the end of the seminar made available to our correspondent, wondered why it took the apex bank six months to recognise the glaring error in the January 2011 guidelines issued on the Non-Interest Financial Institutions (NIFI), whose "framework was limited in its application as it equated NIB (Non-Interest Banking) to Islamic Banking, in effect barring potential non-Muslim or non-Shariah compliant investors and participants from tapping into the benefits of NIB." 

Moreover, they continued, "the framework clearly demanded that NIFI "transacts banking business, etc... and commercial activities as well as the provision of financial products and services in accordance with Shariah principles and rules of Islamic commercial jurisprudence". It also prescribed that prospective NIB operators specify in their memorandum and article of incorporation that "their business operations will be conducted according with Shariah principles and practices", and that "all licensed NIFIs shall have an internal Shariah compliance review mechanism and a Shariah Advisory Committee (SAC) as part of their governance structure".  These and similar elements of the new framework needed to be changed."

The new framework re-issued on Tuesday, June 21, 2011, according to the communiqué is not fail-safe however, as it still recognises that "Islamic banking is only one aspect of NIB and now recognises 'Other Non Interest Financial Institutions' to accommodate other NIB models whether faith-based or otherwise." 

While noting that the seminar organisers are willing to work with the apex bank in developing a better framework, the participants urged the CBN to "consult more broadly in developing an enhanced banking and investing framework. Such framework should, in addition to the expected banking supervisory items such as solvency, capital adequacy, adequate risk management, transparent reporting, have" elements like: 

• A broader framework that accommodates all faiths, hence name a change in the name to Profit and Loss Sharing Bank, as provided for by BOFIA, or Faith-Based Financing (FBF).

• Adopting "values-" as well as "law-driven" approach should be adopted with elements such as:

i. Fairness: transparency and social justice

ii. Social well-being: prohibition of certain types of transactions (like gambling, derivatives, etc.)

iii. Zero-to-appropriate interest rate: returns based on wealth-generating investments

iv. Shared risk and profits: one party does not benefit at the expense of the other

v. Contractual clarity and certainty: elimination of ambiguities, enabling non-sophisticated investors/customers transact banking and investment business with trust and transparency

vi. Discouragement of consumer debt

c. The framework should recognize multiple tiers of FBF institutions based on level of adherence to the above listed FBF values. 

i. Totally Non-interest: clarity and transparency about zero interest in this category with no hidden charges.

ii. Appropriate Interest: a constrained interest rate, based o a variety of factors to be agreed upon in the guidelines.

The participants agreed however that if properly regulated and administered, the NIB and FBF, "have the potential to transform the economies of underdeveloped communities, hence is a welcome development in Nigeria where on-going banking reforms have made interest-charging deposit money banks more risk averse and perhaps unwilling to venture into virgin frontiers in banking.  The unbanked and under-banked in Nigeria will benefit from FBF where risk and returns are shared between provider and user of financing.  There is however need for a supervisory framework that recognises the peculiarities, applicability and potential of FBF including the following:

a. Stimulating grassroots, relationally-based investing (versus debt-based financing)

b. Countering corruption through transparency and other faith-based financing (FBF) principles

c. Avoiding speculative bubbles and decreasing reckless investing

d. Avoiding consumer and other debt that is detached from real assets and initiatives." 

Eghes Eyieyien, chief executive, Pharez Limited, a Lagos-based risk management, ratings, consulting, human capital development & training, and investment firm, who was lead speaker at the seminar insisted in his presentation, for example, that "the CBN cannot use a guideline to change the law, (and that) the CBN is not the National Assembly. The CBN lawyers should go back and look at the guidelines again, because you cannot use a small provision in BOFIA that gives you the power to regulate to begin to legislate."

Continuing, he advised that "if Islamic banking must happen, the CBN should send a draft bill to the National Assembly."

According to him, "the NIFI Framework stated that: "A Non-Interest Financial Institution (NIFI) means a bank or Other Financial Institution (OFI) under the purview of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), which transacts banking business, engages in trading, investment and commercial activities as well as the provision of financial products and services in accordance with Shariah principles and rules of Islamic commercial jurisprudence." The Glossary of Terms of the CBN's NIFI Framework states that: Shariah Principles refers to "the divine guidance as given by the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet and embodies all aspects of the Islamic faith, including beliefs and practices".

"The only legally valid definition is stated in Section 61 of the (BOFIA) of 1991 which speaks of a "Profit and Loss Sharing Bank". That is, "a bank which transacts investment or commercial banking business and maintains profits and loss sharing accounts". Profit and Loss Banking has always been the interpretation and understanding of Non-Interest Financial Services in Nigeria. When the CBN granted an Approval-in-Principle Licence to Jaiz International Bank Plc in 2004 while Chief Joseph Sanusi was the CBN Governor, the licence was issued for it to carry on business as a Profit and Loss Sharing Bank. Curiously, the present CBN Governor, Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, was widely reported in the mass media to have announced on Monday, 20th June, 2011, at a Conference on Islamic Banking in Dakar, Senegal, that the CBN had issued(?) Jaiz International Bank Plc an Approval-in-Principle as the "first Islamic Bank in the country". Jaiz Bank was unable to operate as a Profit and Loss Sharing Bank, not because there was no Islamic Banking Guideline, but simply because it was unable to raise the minimum capital requirement of N25 billion. The CBN has now inexplicably lowered the capital requirement for Islamic Banks to just N10 billion to achieve "National Bank" status as against the N25 billion it stipulated for Deposit Money Banks. Why is the Sanusi Lamido Sanusi-led CBN unduly eager to make life easier for Jaiz International Bank and other proposed Islamic Banks?"

Fielding questions from participants at the seminar, Muoghalu called for submission of other models of non-interest banking, arguing that the Islamic type is the one that is well known and practiced across the globe even in the UK, insisting that the CBN is acting within its powers, since the guidelines is part of ongoing reforms leading to the cancellation of universal banking licenses, because the model has not worked well. Universal banking, he added, encouraged the aggregation of risk by the banks, without contributing adequately to national development.

The Deputy Governor expressed worry at the way in which the proposed licensing of Islamic banking is being tied to Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, the CBN Governor being a Muslim. The process began in 2008 with the formation of the Islamic Finance Working Group with representatives from the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), Debt Management Office and the CBN (under Chukwuma Soludo, a Christian) as observer. Nigeria, he added, joined the Islamic Financial Services Board also in 2008 and formally admitted early in 2009 before the current CBN Governor assumed office.

He noted that the CBN under Sanusi remains passionate about the nation's financial system and the need to effectively intermediate in all aspects of the economy. This zeal, he stressed, has resulted in the ongoing banking reforms, the SME and power sectors, in a bid to ensure long-term loans at single digits to operators in the real sectors of the economy, as part of the CBN's mandate.

Firing back, Eyienyen stressed: "It will be disingenuous for anybody to say we are concluding what Soludo started. I am surprised as to why it is the CBN Governor and not the DMO that is talking about sukuk (Islamic or non-interest bonds). What is the inordinate drive to set up Islamic banking," he wondered.

He noted that his disagreement with the proposal is out of professionalism and about the law, rather than just blowing empty air, wondering why the same amount of passion and priority has not been invested in the Small and Medium Enterprises Equity Investment Scheme (SMEEIS), which was made optional after five years of being compulsory.

In his presentation earlier, Bett Johnson, another facilitator, author and Founder, of Califonia-based Institute for Innovation, Integration and Impact, while praising the CBN for the political will to embark on the stress testing in 2009 and even delving into alternative financing models, noted that faith based financing encourages good business practice, forgiveness and reduction in greed.

He however warned that practitioners must be regulated from within Nigeria and not by a body of non-Nigerians, or people resident outside of the country, in view of the lack of adequate capacity and competence. He made this observation against the backdrop of a provision in the guideline for a body of experts to advise the CBN on the practice of Islamic banking.

Speaking at the weekend in Ilorin, Kwara State however, Deputy Governor, Economic Policy of CBN, Mrs. Sarah Alade, told newsmen at a retreat for the Financial Market Department that apart from the Islamic banking, there are other forms of non-interest banking for which interested parties can get licence.

Issuing a licences to operate Islamic banks, she told participants at the retreat with the theme: "Transforming the Nigerian Financial Market: Prospects and Challenges," does not translate to Islamising Nigeria. The CBN, she added, is interest in changing the face of banking for economy for the betterment of Nigerians.

Rather than base the guidelines on provisions of any religion, Brett wants the apex bank to incline towards universal truths, focused on benefits to the society, rather than being specific to one particular faith.

According to him, "we should go beyond Islamic banking, (which) has not necessarily produced good returns. Islamic banking in the UK has been a huge flop. The fact that there is a Christian name on a bank does not make it better than any other one. Nigeria should go for the bigger picture, not Islamic, or non-interest banking, but go for a full repurposing of capital."

Conclusion

According to Kayode Ogundamisi, a blogger, "if it is Islamic banking because Holy Quran (in Chap 2 verses 228, 275 and 280) advised against giving loans with interest, it may as well be termed Christian banking since the Holy Bible (in Psalm 15 verse 5, and Deuteronomy 23:19) is equally against 'usury' (interest). Stop the bigotry."

URL of this Page: http://www.independentngonline.com/DailyIndependent/Article.aspx?id=36304

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Asadullah Syed

Inheritance and opposition

Inheritance and opposition
01 May 2011
Globe Editorial
By Azad Amin

The political entity in Kurdistan Region came as a result of internal and external factors in 1992,

The persistent administrative and economic problems in Kurdistan Region, and the growing gap of inequalities in distribution of generated wealth, are fundamental sources of public apprehension in which the opposition movement, a combination of secular and Islamic forces, tries to exploit for political gain. This exploitation of the general public's apprehension for narrow political party interests adds to the complexity of the sociopolitical situation in the Region and makes it more difficult for profound and structural adjustment to address the systematic problems faced by both the ruling elite and the public at large.

The political entity in Kurdistan Region came as a result of internal and external factors in 1992, and inherited economic and political artifacts of the former Baathist regime. The artificial creation of an Iraqi state apparatus, combined with ethnic and religious heterogeneity, produced an extremely refractory inheritance for state-building. The problem of state-building was put in a contemptuous tone by King Faisal in 1933 and depicts the 20th century's repressive regime in Iraq: "In Iraq, there is still no Iraqi people, but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic ideal, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatsoever."

Following the 1958 Revolution, which overthrew the monarchy and instituted a republic, the landed political class was replaced by civil and military bureaucratic class in control of state apparatus. Monopolization of state apparatus by this new class, under a charismatic leader, was the prime reason for the emergence of state-based clientelism and formation of bureaucratic control organized by the civil- military apparatus. So, the primary functions of the state apparatus have been the consolidation of its rule over and against the other segments of society whether ethnic, class or religious. This was in parallel with strict state control and mobilization of economic resources for state-led economic development. The Baath regime had tight control over social, political and economic life, with a driving ideology of Arab nationalism. This translates to the Sunni assertion in a state where they were significantly outnumbered.

Such main characteristics of the Baath regime, which is not unique to Iraq but can be applied to the most of the regimes in the Middle East, explains the lack of democracy in the region. The development of liberal democracy requires two fundamental preconditions: A significant degree of separation between the institutions of rule and of surplus appropriation, and the ability of the state to uphold its authority against other sites of political command. These two preconditions have been absent not only in Iraq but much of the region.

What was inherited in post-Baath Iraq was a highly bureaucratized state apparatus. The political entity in Kurdistan region since 1992, and the political entity of Iraq in post-Saddam era, faced this serious dilemma to deal with the bureaucratic character of the regime that they inherited.

From 1992 to 2003, the Kurdistan Regional Government, due to limited economic resources and its fragile political existence ― its unrecognized de facto existence combined with unfriendly neighbors due to the Kurdish national question for these neighbors ― failed to fight against the bureaucratic nature of the regime it inherited. The ensuing internal conflict between the two main Kurdish political parties further increased party-based clientelism. What we see in Kurdistan Region during this period was the transformation from state-based clientelism to party-based clientelism within the framework of limited economic resources. This constrained both development of democracy and the formation of a liberal market economy in the region.

What differentiated the Kurdish polity form that of the former Baathist regime is the development of democratic space for other ethnic and religious minorities in Kurdistan. Ethnic and religious minorities in Kurdistan enjoyed and exercised their democratic rights fully, without restrictions. Minority and religious rights in Kurdistan can be compared with European standards, not with the other regional regimes.

Following the demise of the Baath regime, structural alterations fundamentally changed the polity and economy of Kurdistan Region. Consolidation of its political status by the new Iraqi constitution and highly efficient stability and security of Kurdistan opened the door for foreign investment and capital to use Kurdistan as a gateway to the rest of Iraq. Regular income from the Iraqi budget (17 percent) to Kurdistan Region provided better opportunities and resources for the KRG to consolidate its power and status.

The expansion of economic resources, such as an allocated share of the Iraqi budget, foreign capital and investment in the region, which led to an economic boom in Kurdistan, became sources of both economic development and apprehension as the distribution of wealth was not equal.

Whether on purpose or not, KRG's economic policies opened the door for capital accumulation geared toward creating a homemade bourgeoisie and entrepreneurs, alongside a growing middle class in the Region. Along with influx of capital and growing economic resources, party-based clientelism strengthened and capital accumulation was mostly based on this clientelism.

KRG not only failed to eliminate party-based clientelism but also to a certain degree failed to deliver basic public services, such as electricity and clean water. Inequalities in the distribution of wealth, lack of sufficient public services, and lack of equal opportunities became sources of public apprehension towards the ruling elite in Kurdistan.

A proper opposition movement with clear political and economic strategy could have easily mobilized such general public discontent towards radical reforms and improvement of democracy in Kurdistan. What the existing opposition in Kurdistan did was not to mobilize people for a better democracy, equal distribution of wealth and better public services, but exploited the discontent for narrow party interests. This alone explains why two months of demonstrations in Suleimaniya province did not spread to the other provinces of Kurdistan Region.

It is unfortunate for Kurdistan Region that a healthy opposition movement could not form at such critical period, during which, political and economic transformation could be easily realized with the driving force of public discontent brought to the arena by the opposition.

The main opposition group, Gorran, demands separation of party and government apparatus. For Gorran, such separation will remedy the corruption and clientelism in Kurdistan. This perception is profoundly misleading. In any democratic regime, government is formed by the political party that gained the majority vote at a general election. Instead of asking separation of party-government it is imperative to ask separation between the institutions of rule and of surplus appropriation.

The so-called opposition movements in Kurdistan, the Gorran, the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Komala of Islam, do not have any clear economic policies or remedies for the existing economic and political problems in Kurdistan Region. Their opposition mainly worked to diminish the power base of the two main ruling Kurdish parties, it did not try to improve standards of living or improve democracy in Kurdistan.

This failure by the opposition movement in Kurdistan caused another and more serious sin to the polity of Kurdistan: It prevents formation of a proper opposition movement that should address the problem issues in Kurdistan and bring alternative policies for public discussion and implementation.

The Kurdish opposition movement should realize that without challenging the inheritance of civil-bureaucratic state apparatus of the Baath regime, there is no short cut to solving the issues in Kurdistan.

URL of this Page;http://www.kurdishglobe.net/display-article.html?id=F86502FB4FDDF798CA224BCCABACF54A

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Asadullah Syed

Domesticating Islam?

Domesticating Islam?

 Blatant interference in internal Islamic affairs: This year, German universities will begin training imams. Yet, should this be a task for the state? The move seems premature and, in the long term, is not viable, says the Islamic scholar Lukas Wick

This fall, courses will be offered to Muslim imams at three universities in Germany. This step was recommend by the German Science Council, welcomed by the press, and even met with the approval of German churches.

The aim of this measure is to integrate Islam into German and European society as well as to prevent the growth of extremism. Amidst all the enthusiasm, an important question has been neglected. Is it really the task of the state to train prayer leaders and religious officials in general?

A concern for Muslims

For one thing, it is justified to ask whether the training of imams conflicts with the constitutional principle of neutrality in religious affairs. According to the German Minister of Education, Annette Schavan, the implicit aim of the imam training programme is to bring Islam into line with enlightened European values – in other words, to domesticate Islam and to deprive so-called radical elements of any influence. Such well-meaning intentions, however, clearly result in interference in internal Islamic affairs.

The aim of the university imam training is to integrate Islam into German and European society as well as to prevent the growth of extremism: Turkish imams in Frankfurt am Main attend German courses The "translation" of Islam to meet German conditions must, in the final analysis, be a matter for Muslims themselves and cannot be achieved through state programmes. Only Muslims can decide for themselves what religious excesses are and which interpretations of their faith are false.

Equally, only they can offer a credible alternative to such deviations in faith. The clear formulation and transmission of Islamic doctrine should be, at the very least, important enough for the various Islamic associations in the country to offer necessary financing. It is namely voluntary, civil society financing that demonstrates an issue is taken seriously.

The development of a critical spirit

It is only the free development of religion that can indicate whether it can adapt to local customs. Disguised state intervention is not viable over the long term, even when the responsible university lecturers propagate a liberal Islam out of their own personal sense of conviction.

According to a study by the Swiss National Foundation, not even a quarter of the Muslims in that country desire such a full university programme for their imams. The majority express the wish that imams complete at least part of their training at an Islamic institution.

It should be mentioned that in Austria, despite the creation of the Islamic Religious Pedagogical Academy (IRPA) in Vienna, it has not been possible to prevent religious teachers and preachers from expressing negative opinions concerning democracy and human rights.

The much complained about integration problems of Muslim imams are homemade. The Turkish religious authorities (Diyanet), for instance, only allow imams to spend up to four years abroad and do not wish to see imams getting to "accustomed" to life in Germany. Research by the Osnabruck-based religious scholar Rauf Ceylan indicates that Turkish imams tend to develop a critical spirit under the influence of conditions in Germany.

And what about the Mormons?

There is also the question as to whether the state should finance the staff of a religious institution not (yet) constituting a statutory body under public law and thereby not able to function as a cooperation partner with the state.

Cultural osmosis: Research by the Osnabruck-based religious scholar Rauf Ceylan indicates that Turkish imams tend to develop a critical spirit under the influence of conditions in Germany In addition, there is the matter of course content, whereby non-Muslims are denigrated with complete disrespect as infidels – or, as was recently the case in a Basel mosque, Switzerland, as swine – and damned to spend eternity in hell, which is not particularly conducive to religious peace in public. The prospect of state intervention also encourages the formation of purely financially motivated alliances and strengthens the position of Islamic associations within the Muslim community.

The state financing of teaching positions and university institutions is a privilege enjoyed by a heterogeneous, yet vocal religious community as opposed to free evangelical groups, whose members often make considerable financial sacrifices in order to train their preachers. To be consistent, the state should provide state educational institutions for them as well. And why not for Mormons, Hindus, Buddhists, and even free thinkers?

Hasty establishment of university posts

In light of the empty pews and an excessive administrative bureaucracy, the established churches are well aware of their privileged positions.

However, instead of undertaking a critical examination of their own situation and perhaps adapting their overblown structures, the churches have been working towards allowing others to share in the fiscal manna – all in the name of interreligious dialogue, or, at least, so goes the official account. It is remarkable that the long overdue debate on the issue of state financing of theological institutes and faculties has still not taken place.

Considering the transformations that have taken place in our society, this issue should no longer remain taboo. And this is not because theology lacks scientific methods or epistemological value, but rather that its confessional orientation finds a steadily diminishing legitimacy within a society marked by increasingly pluralistic lifestyles. The establishment of university teaching posts in Germany for the training of imams has clearly been a hasty decision.

Lukas Wick

© Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung / Qantara.de 2011

Lukas Wick is an Islamic scholar. His dissertation at the University of Bern has been published under the title "Islam und Verfassungsstaat. Theologische Versöhnung mit der politischen Moderne?" (Islam and the Constitutional State. Theological Reconciliation with Political Modernity?).

Qantara.de editor: Lewis Gropp

URL of this Page: http://en.qantara.de/wcsite.php?wc_c=15934&wc_id=16125

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Asadullah Syed

MQM-Altaf was behind 2009 ‘Ashura Bombings’

MQM-Altaf was behind 2009 'Ashura Bombings'
MQM – Indian agent 'Ajmal Pharee' confessed to Joint Investigation Team

By Dr Shahid Qureshi
Sunday 03 April 2011
MQM- Altaf terrorist and Indian agent Ajmal Pharee confessed to the Joint Investigation Team of (ISI, IB, Military Intelligence, CID, Special Branch etc) that, "MQM-Altaf was behind the 'Asura Bombings of 2009' in Karachi. He confessed to the team that he and other MQM city workers were ordered to wear black Shia mourning clothes on the day in a meeting called three days before the Ashura bombings. The orders were to burn the shops and businesses in and around Light House as well as kill the people. The shop owners of that area refused to give extortion money to the MQM-Altaf. These burnings caused losses of billions to the poor Pakistanis and shop owners in Karachi". 

Mustafa Kamal billionaire - poor former mayor of Karachi become abusive when London Post report published on 31st December 2009, was quoted that, 'MQM was involved in Karachi bombings with black water', in a live program by famous anchor Talat Hussain. Faces of the looters were visible on CCTVs footages still available on youtube.

MQM – Altaf terrorist and high value asset   Ajmal Pharee also confessed to the JIT that he has received terrorist training in New Delhi from five Indian Army officers. During this training he was informed about Altaf Hussain's desire to separate Karachi from Pakistan. Altaf Husain is a British Citizen   and considered as high value asset by some analysts.

Ajmal Pharee also confessed murdering 55 people as well as receiving training in India by Indian security agencies. In a video statement he said, "I joined MQM in 1988 arrested in 1989 for fire arms offences imprisoned for one year. He was arrested and sentenced for five years again in 2000 for murdering Iqbal Raad, lawyer of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. He told the JIT that his handler Nadeem Nusrat is based in MQM – Altaf's London Secretariat and inner circle man of Altaf Hussain. Ajmal Pharee told the JIT that, 'Nadeem Nusrat told him to escape from Pakistan to Singapore in 1996 with Zeshan a MQM worker'.  He stayed in the Mustafa Market Hotel on his instructions in Singapore, where he was given Singapore Airline tickets and Indian visas by Jamil aka Jimi who lives in South Africa. They travelled to Delhi, stayed there for 15 days and later received terrorist training for one month in a near by jungle  by five Indian army officers. He also met other MQM-Altaf workers Noora of Shah Faiasl Colony, Zafar Tension of Buffer Zone, Raju of Nazim-a-Bad, Shakir Chota of Orangi Town. He received terrorist training of AK-47, RPG, MP-5 LMG, hand grenades. He was transported to India-Pakistan border inserted in from Chawanda area of Shakr Gurh (Sialkot) in Pakistan. They later went to Lahore and than Karachi", said Ajmal Pharee in his confessions.

On 31st December 2009, The London Post, exclusively published the story "Blackwater and MQM's Hallmarks on Karachi Fire – Bombings". The above confession by the MQM Terrorist now confirm that MQM – Altaf was behind the fire bombing and criminal damage in Karachi.

"MQM and Blackwater/Xe are US sponsored mafia style mercenary outfits due to their management structure as it is almost the same both groups' chiefs are out of Pakistan to start with. There is no difference between Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and MQM because both are sponsored by India and USA. Sawat type operation against MQM's 'Clean Shaven Taliban' who are supporting Blackwater/Xe is a must because people will support. 

The recent bombings of a religious procession in Karachi and fire bombings of small businesses miles away from the incident reportedly owned by mostly Sunni Tableghie Jamat a non violent religious group, got all the hall marks of 'private mercenaries' Blackwater with the support of MQM. According to reports it is physically not possible for any one attending the procession to go miles away, get special fire bombing chemicals and equipment to set fire 300 hundred shops in Bolton Market. It is only possible if one already knows the timing of the bombings and part of the plot. They targeted a Sunni areas where it is almost impossible for an angry 'Shia protestor' to reach from the crime scene keeping in the view the distances. So Shia procession was bombed, Sunni business were burnt down and MQM's fire engines did not arrive. Seems perfect Blackwater Inc style operation? 

Blackwater, MQM's Plus plan was meticulous and well timed. (a) Timing of the bombing few days before the end of the term of City Government Term. So City Government building burnt down with the record to cover-up corruption?  (b) Selection of the venues to be fire bombed (c) Torching of Light House Market predominantly owned by the Pashtuns who did not pay extortion money to the MQM – Score settled, Job done (d) Torching of Bolton Market mostly business are owned by peaceful Sunni Muslims Memon Community. They refused to be relocated outside the city because shops worth millions. High ups of the current regime allegedly President Zardari & Co had interest in the land to develop and build flats and plazas. (Job done) (e) Why MQM leaders both reportedly Shias Haider Abbas Rizvi and Faisal Sabzwari not in the Ashura procession? (f) Why police and rangers did not stop the arsonists and terrorists? (g) Who ordered them not to act? (h) Remote control bomb was planted in an ambulance which might be carrying a head too? (i) Who is Hasham Al-Zafar (central) and what is his role in the bombing and burning of Karachi? (j) What is his relationship with Saleem Shezad alleged master mind of the operation and why he only reports to Altaf Hussain?

MQM and Blackwater/Xe are US sponsored mafia style mercenary outfits due to their management structure as it is almost the same both groups' chiefs are out of Pakistan to start with. MQM are the local collaborators of Blackwater/Xe in Pakistan? 

According to sources similar kinds of chemicals and fire bombing equipments have been used in Iraq and Lebanon. Pakistan's security agencies must look into the links between MQM lead City Government and Blackwater.  What kind of assistance they are providing to the mercenaries. City mayor Syed Mustafa Kamal and Governor Sind Dr Ashrat Abad Khan recently visited sensitive institutions of the USA related to protection of US national interests aboard. Why would a mayor of a third world country visit US State Department? Did he inform Pakistani's foreign ministry? He is on the grooming list. "To his credentials it was Mustafa Kamal who opened the door for the assassins came to kill his 'uncle' Azeem Ahmed Tariq, leader of the MQM, as it was an inside job. It sounds like nephew shopped his 'uncle' according to a source.

Altaf Hussain's MQM and his mafia have caused more economic and human losses to Pakistan by strikes and terrorist activities then three wars with India. After the incident on Monday December 28, 2009, three thousand shops were burnt; one thousand were burnt after looting which caused loss of Rs. 60 billion to Pakistani economy. Armed men stopped fire engines for over three hours according to reports. Why?

Elements close to MQM were also allegedly involved in the terrorism, arson, and killings after tragic death of Benazir Bhutto on 27th December 2007. Many analysts believe that it was a dry run by the foreign sponsored elements to separate Karachi from the rest of the country. There is another dimension to the burring of some markets with small business. Some people from land mafia were making hostile offers to these old pre partition businesses.

There are reports that MQM has issued thousands of arms licences to its workers and sympathisers in Karachi and some of the licences might have been issued from other provinces. Disarming of the terrorist groups including MQM in Karachi is necessary to avoid future blackmails.

It is also reported that armed gunmen did not allow fire engines to leave the fire stations. All the fire engines and security cameras are under the control of City Government run by MQM whose leader Altaf Hussain controls this group in a mafia style. Within minutes he blamed 'Taliban' for the bombings. How did he know it was Taliban and not Indian RAW or Blackwater/Xe? Altaf Hussain deliberately tried to make this a sectarian issue in his live TV broadcast on a news channel, which matches the agenda of private mercenaries and India.

Asia Times Online reported few years ago during Musharraf era, sources says that, "only US diplomatic intervention stopped General Musharraf from taking strong action against the MQM after he received the report on the recent unrest in which the MQM was implicated. Washington indeed has a powerful southern ally in Pakistan'. After September 11, the United States identified even more with the MQM as it was the only party in Pakistan that widely mourned the attacks on the US, openly condemned the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and launched a powerful campaign in support of the US attack on Afghanistan".

When President Zardari speak about 'non state & political actors', probably he also meant Altaf Hussain too? His long distance proactive and dramatic telephonic speeches are more or less what Lord Nelson said, "If you can't baffle them with brilliance, dazzle them with bullshit!". He is never been to Pakistan for more then 15 years but did travel to India on his British passport. Most of the members in mafia style 'Rabita Committee' are wanted by Pakistani authorities for heinous crimes.  He hides behind this 'kangaroo committee'. 

A political analyst said, 'to get 'poodle status' in US administration Altaf Hussain exaggerates things beyond imagination. For example, he claimed his supporters in Karachi increased by 10 million in just two years because he claimed to have 20 million supporters in an interview with Edgware Times in November 1998. But in 2001 MQM claimed to have 30 million supporters when MQM send a fax to Reuters on 22 September 2001. "(MQM leader) Altaf Hussain has offered the unconditional support of over 30 million MQM supporters to the U.S. president and the international community," its London-based international secretariat said in a statement faxed to Reuters on September 22, 2001".

According to sources, 'Altaf group is planning and preparing for armed fight with other groups in Karachi. There might be a plan to divide Karachi on ethnic zones as Rehman Malik mentioned in Dera Ismail Khan? The alleged transfer of money from Karachi to London, Germany, Dubai, South Africa, Canada, and United States is alarming. There reports of increase in the arms sale in Karachi seem serious but what are the authorities doing?

So what is Altaf Hussain up to that is a crucial question to political and security leadership to think about. His alleged close links with the Indian agency and also acting like a mercenary force getting orders from foreign masters. It is time for the government of Pakistan to approach its friends and allies to have a clear cut answers about the real Agenda in Pakistan? Crimes of Altaf Hussain and his party MQM are so heinous that he wouldn't dare step in Karachi even the whole period of Musharraf and now Zardari rule?

Until November 1998 Government of Pakistan was reportedly seeking extradition of Altaf Hussain who was said to be wanted in 50 murders and 150 cases of kidnapping and arson. He said in an interview with a newspaper in 1998, "It is my wish that they take me to trial in a British court then I will tell people nationally and internationally what has been happening in Pakistan." It was Altaf Hussain and MQM who issued a memo to his workers saying," if there was war between India and Pakistan, MQM workers will be remain neutral". Why?

MQM's deputy chief organiser of district Thatta and his wife were arrested by the police for trafficking 120 kilos of A class drugs   according to a press report on 16th May 2004. Mohamed Ibrahim and his wife Ayesha Soho who is also member of district government were coming from Bolan area of Baluchistan on Jeep number BC 1248 when they were stopped by Dadar Police who discovered 180 kilos of HASH worth millions of from the secret compartments of the jeep. Police has registered a case number 13/2004 report against deputy chief of MQM and his wife for drug trafficking. Area in charge SHO of the area Police confirmed that suspects have confessed they have been also involved in arms trafficking from Kabul and been to Afghanistan three times. Both were sent to Sibi Jail in Baluchistan.

"MQM has been funded with the drug money apart from the extortion money taken from the top businessmen in the name of support" according to a report published by 

The Frontier Post published on December 25, 1998. The report says, "… What is more alarming is that the Narco dollars have been used for funding the (MQM), a responsible source in the provincial government said. He added that such funding was tantamount to fuelling terrorism." Is the Narco-terror funding still on?

By joining as local collaborator of Blackwater in Karachi MQM has provided the eyes and ears on the ground with smart guns. Even if US-India sponsored 'Pakistani Taliban' claim responsibility of Karachi Ashura bombings, the chemicals and smart guns used in burnings of the over 6000 small businesses and loss of Rs. 60 billion have all the hallmarks of Blackwater/Xe. 

"There is no difference between Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and MQM because both are sponsored by India and USA. Sawat type operation against MQM's 'Clean Shaven Taliban' who are supporting Blackwater/Xe is a must because people will support." 

People must congratulate interior minister Sindh Zulifqar Mirza for his bravery in dealing with MQM-Altaf terrorists on the instructions of President Zardari. The recent murder of the nephew of imprisoned MQM-Haqaqi leader Amir Khan is a clear sign that MQM-Altaf is losing control of the city and panicking. Sooner or later upon the release of the confession videos of the MQM target killers stating the orders were coming from London by allegedly a British Citizen will put British establishment into legal dilemmas as exporting terrorism to Pakistan as well as harbouring terrorists?

"26 target killers belong to MQM-Altaf Hussain based in London said", Home Minister Zulifqar Mirza who considered as the right hand man of President Zardari and Rehman Malik left hand man. Every one knows what most people do with their left hand in Pakistan? 

(Dr Shahid Qureshi writer on foreign policy & security based in London)

URL of this Page: http://www.thelondonpost.net/April03201100039.html

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Asadullah Syed